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To newcomers to the field value can appear so complicated as to not only seem a terribly 
intimidating topic, but also one that is actually fruitless to pursue. That is, the concept of value, 
as an object of study and lever of political change, is either a dead end or best left to the 
experts. We disagree. Value is a critical and potentially straightforward concept in need of 
further theoretical and empirical exploration. At the most general level, having value can be 
understood as having the capacity to be measured and compared against another thing (or a 
standard). This is consistent with Marxian concepts (which are elaborated with special 
reference to the specifically capitalist value form), but it is also simple and general enough to 
provide an easily-transportable frame for discussing the role of value and measurement in any 
context imaginable, whether it be a discussion of spiritualism, collective action, economic data, 
or physical science. Marx directs our attention to the political constitution of systems of 
measure on the very first page of Capital, and there is now a great deal of work in geography 
and in science and technology studies on the social constitution of systems of measure and 
valuation. We believe this crucial topic deserves an accessible approach that can reveal unities 
among Marx’s work in Capital, and thus supplement technical valuation practices with the 
moral and critical political economic critique made possible by Marxian value theory. 
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The ultimate stake of politics… is not even the struggle to appropriate value; it is the struggle to 
establish what value is. 
David Graeber (2001, 88) 
  
To all but the dedicated theorist value can appear so complicated and amorphous as to seem 
like terribly intimidating and fruitless object of study. That is, the concept of value seems either 
a dead end or best left to the experts. At a recent geography conference, it was argued by some 
eminent theorists that studying ‘value’ is a fascinating but ultimately fruitless task. We disagree. 
At its root, value is the quality of being measurable and comparable with other things. We 





differences usually rest on valuation regimes—the rules for and modes of comparison—rather 
than on the concept of value itself. If it is true that the terms ‘value’ or ‘values’ are used in ways 
that seem incompatible, it might also be that we are being distracted by their apparent 
dissonance and ignoring their elements of unity. Understanding value as the capacity to be 
measured or compared lets us see how apparently incompatible value regimes flow from 
foundational choices about what is to be counted, visible and present. These choices are social 
practices that can represent real levers of change. Multiple ways of comparing and measuring 
things are usually co-present in all settings, and yet those regimes are all predicated on the 
capacity for index, either qualitative or quantitative. Our observations in this article engage 
specifically with examples from capitalist valuation practices, but we argue that value-as-
measure is applicable across any political-economic arrangement. It remains important to 
theorize and understand the capitalist value form and its extension into nature, but it is equally 
important to understand how capitalist value is situated alongside other types of values, 
forming a basis for political intervention. Recognizing the co-presence of valuation regimes is 
one path towards contesting the expansion of the logics of capital on the terrain of nature.  
  
Value as a concept, and valuation as diverse and often dissonant social practices, can be as 
complex as you like. One need only refer to contemporary Marxist value-form philology, the 
construction of models for predicting climate change, or any piece of church doctrine to see the 
logical contortions made possible by a concern with values and the systems of measure by 
which to ascertain them. There has also been an academic trend since the 1990s to consider 
value theory—and especially its normative implications—as inherently a project of “left-over, 
would-be intellectual imperialism” (Graeber 2013, 221), a project that many social sciences 
were defining themselves against. Our inability to talk about value except in the most 
convoluted of theoretical terms means we are ceding the field of comparison and 
measurement, along with its normative consequences, in social life.  
 
Sometimes this surrender takes the form of a gesture at the fundamental, analytically 
paralyzing incomparability between, for example, the commodification of forest carbon and the 
livelihood strategies of indigenous people. And because value is the ground on which the 
assessment and ranking of objects and goals takes place, this gesture comes close to ceding 
politics entirely. Finding incompatibility between values is not an endpoint, but must lead 
onward to questions of how such incompatibilities are socially constituted through different 
measures and often reconciled in more or less violent or absurd ways. Forest carbon and 
indigenous lives are often made measurable in the same value regime; the laws and guns that 
are often nearby when this happens show that valuation is political work. To claim instead that 
indigenous livelihoods are incomparable, inimitable, in-valuable is to retreat from politics and 
the imperative to find a better and more survivable way of translating the value of their lives 





shared commitment to understanding, as well as contesting, the fuller and deeper entry of 
capital into the socionatural world.  
  
Investigating the incompatibility of the capitalist value regime with other ways of measuring the 
world must not end with an anticlimactic gesture at axiomatic differences, safely bracketed. 
Doing value theory means stepping out of that safety, because these incommensurabilities do 
not prevent them from having material impacts on the world (Holm 2007). We must not, as 
Blomley (2008, 1840) says, “risk ignoring the ways in which such absurdities organize the world 
for us in often brutally efficient and powerful ways.” These apparent incompatibilities in 
regimes of value may not be just, desirable, or even fully knowable, but they remain forceful. 
The rationale for any social strategy rests on agreements (both formal and tacit) about what 
constitutes a value or is valuable. The choice of what to include in and exclude from 
representation of value is always political, as is the indexification of the resulting abstractions.  
 
Usually, the key elements of a social system are naturalized and walled off across an epistemic 
frontier, as with the axiom within mainstream economics that value is a strictly unobservable 
mental preference whose only proxy is price in a clearing market. It is the job of the value 
theorist to show how and when these divisions are actively maintained, performed and 
reinforced—usually in a way which is meant to be invisible or non-agential. At the current 
juncture, this requires us to pay careful attention to the extension of capitalist values into new 
realms, but simultaneously not ignore the broader value-laden context in which these 
expansions occur. For example, the fundamental assumption of carbon trading is that 
emissions, no matter where they occur or for what purpose they are released, must be treated 
as fully fungible. Achieving fungibility rests on practices of measure and commensurability 
between different greenhouse gases and attaching that measure to a monetary price signal, 
despite the instability of the scientific equivalencies that make gases measurable through a 
single metric—global warming potential (MacKenzie 2009). This process lacks a moment where 
we evaluate the relative desirability of different emitting activities, so, following Felli (2015), 
climate pollution from powering a school and from refining yacht fuel must be treated equally 
despite the glaring discrepancy in social import. Each of these practices requires choices 
informed by regimes of value to be taken, and so each represents an entry point to politics.  
 
Value is so foundational, in fact, that it is everywhere—even and especially in the basic scene-
setting task of distinguishing objects from each other so that distinctions can be made and 
dramas can unfold in the theatre of difference. Much of the study of value, therefore, focuses 
offstage, before objects become obviously distinct. Since the point of a successful regime of 
valuation is to become natural and non-controversial (when was the last time you heard 
someone debate the true measure of the gallon or the kilogram?), searching for those 
moments when valuation is visibly contested in the light of day can be a lonely task. But if value 





important work. Arguing about whether one thing is taller or bluer or more expensive than 
another is important, but so is the decision that inches, electromagnetic frequency, or dollars 
will be the measure used, and so is a discussion of who these decisions marginalize and silence. 
The measurement of the thing is not as important as the settlement about what measurement 
is and what ruler will be used. 
 
Systems of Valuation  
How do we conceive of such a polysemic word in a unified way? Graeber (2001) observes a 
tripartite division in how the term is used, distinguishing between moral, semiotic and 
economic valences of value; all are used in the iterative performances of comparison that form 
a central part of any culture. This process-oriented understanding reminds us that nothing, be it 
cultural or natural, is intrinsically valuable; value is found, affirmed, realized, or destroyed 
through ongoing social performances of comparison and measure. Those performances assess 
moral value when they compare things against how they ought to be, they assess semiotic 
value when they use comparison to distinguish between different objects, and they assess 
economic value when they compare things for the purpose of exchange, often denominated in 
units of money. While different regimes of valuation may be used in different moments, and 
considerable tension is observed when such valuation practices change, a single concept of 
value encompasses all such moments. 
 
As a result, value as a concept may be simple, but the practices of valuation often are not. 
Creating social contexts within which comparison is possible and achieving commensuration 
through an indexical system are difficult, delicate tasks. Indeed, they are some of the most 
elaborate and arcane behaviors in any human society. However, the ultimate goal is always to 
create the possibility for comparison through the representation of phenomena in quanta of 
money, national happiness, pounds of phosphorous emitted from a wastewater treatment 
plant, and so on. In Graeber’s sense, the capacity to quantify is the capacity to delineate what 
something is not through semiotic representation; one pound of phosphorous is not 1.1 
pounds. The method by which one ascertains whether or not a wastewater treatment plant has 
emitted 1 or 1.1 pounds is a socio-technical practice1 that flows from the decision to quantify 
effluent for the purpose of constraining its emission in the first place. This, in turn, flows from a 
commitment to classify substances that are potentially harmful and to measure their effect 
against an index of (abstract) human health, and to do so in a way that makes effluent available 
to capitalist valuation. So, underlying the drily scientific ‘value’ of 1.1 is the normative and 
                                               
1
 This is a stylised process of measure, the selection of semiotic values, and their relationship to co-present 
valuation regimes. Other considerations include the appropriate level of accuracy in measure, moral valuation of 
species other than humans, and the issue of which humans’ health is valued. This is true of any example we might 
choose to present because values, as a practice of indexification, are always built upon ever more ontologically 





moral ‘value’ of human well-being, which then makes the underlying effluent legible for 
economic valuation and potential exchange. 
  
Integrating Regimes of Valuation 
There are many ways to study value, but we see a good opportunity for collaboration between 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) and political economy. If one accepts Graeber’s typology 
of values-in-process as a system of comparability, STS can help to unpack the ‘how’ of value 
while political economy (particularly of a culturally-inflected variety) is more attuned to the 
‘why’ of value. That is, STS is able to examine the technics of comparison and measurement, 
and political economy can provide the analysis of power relations by which a measurement is 
allowed to become a standard and the social basis for comparison. Once we understand the 
semiotic and political-economic valuations in a given setting, we can evaluate the moral basis 
and implications of these regimes and compare them with what ought to be (Fourcade 2011). 
Christophers (2014) notes, in the context of the study of markets, that political economy and 
STS (or ‘performativity approaches’) have long been portrayed as at odds with one another, or 
even as antithetical, before offering a conceptual path toward reconciliation. We point to a 
similar synthesis for thinking about value(s) by suggesting that political economy and STS are 
amenable to reduction using the frame of value, and so provide crucial perspectives on 
practices and regimes of valuation. This approach recognizes that it is not only metrics or only 
exploitation that make socialnatures: both are essential parts of a fully functioning capitalist 
regime of valuation, a utopian moral value regime that makes these socionatures not only 
possible but desirable (McCloseky 2006; cf. Zizek 2008). 
 
A combined STS/Marxian approach to value is powerful because Marx’s concept encompasses 
economic and moral valences of value, while valuation studies and STS allow for sophisticated 
understandings of semiotic valence, the task of creating distinctions between things, performed 
by people with specific motivations and in particular contexts. Observing how valuation is done 
becomes critical as technocratic forms of environmental management proliferate. Technocratic 
measurement techniques are often bundled with the capacity to obfuscate the moral values 
that sanction their use. However, a focus on technical processes of valuation doesn’t require 
subscribing to a ‘flattened’ ontology wherein all things (as actors) have an equal capacity to 
(re)create socialnatures (cf. Lave 2013). Rather, we suggest focusing on the people who 
perform valuations that make natures legible to capital. An STS approach can guide us to the 
point at which we are able to see the technical barriers to commodifying ecosystem services 
(Dempsey and Suarez 2016), the imprecision of measurements in CO2 emissions (MacKenzie 
2009), or the difficulties of determining when a degraded stream has been adequately restored 
(Lave 2012). But STS tends not to show us the social conditions under which an attribution of 
value allows the circulation of these objects in exchange. This happens when specific people in 
specific places argue for, modify, or consent to a valuation regime. In their daily lives they (and 





value form, and it may underlie important actually-existing power structures, but its 
complicated and non-deterministic relationship with other valuation regimes is one way of 
understanding the spaces of anti- or non-capitalism, and opportunities for change (Gibson-
Graham 2006; Moore 2015).  
 
If they engage with value at all, most geographers are used to thinking about (or around or 
against) value as defined by Marx, who was concerned only with the specific regime of 
measuring value native to the capitalist mode of production (see Huber 2016). Understanding 
this special, dominant form of value is clearly important, but it is just as important to 
understand the extent to which the capitalist form co-exists with many others. For Marx, the 
measure of value in capitalism is not physical labor per se but abstracted “socially necessary 
labor-time.” The object that bears this kind of value only becomes visible and measurable after 
a set of social agreements about how effort is measured and how the products of effort are 
quantified and distributed. Even then, much trouble has ensued from the confusion between a) 
the achievement of comparability and b) the units in which comparison is made. Thus, price is 
not value in the same way that an inch is not height. Marx’s usefulness as a value theorist is in 
part that he draws us firmly back to the moral valence of value that is explicitly excluded when 
one considers only the units in which valuation is performed. For Marx, the appropriation of 
value created by others is a cause of immiseration (Karatani and Wainwright 2012) and those 
who wield the value form actively obscure its basis. Therefore, one way to resist the inequities 
of capitalism is to observe the daily and often technical ways that non-capitalist practices and 
regimes of valuation are subordinated to the capitalist value form. This project takes on 
increasing urgency as we reach the end of cheap nature (Moore 2015) and ever more facets of 
the environment come to be represented through a regime of value in which comparisons are 
denominated in money, as in payments for ecosystems services and the practices of natural 
capital accounting on which they are based.  
 
Politics of Values 
Political possibilities are varied when taking this approach. For example, depending on the 
setting, one could choose to prioritize (in Graeber’s taxonomy) moral values, i.e., “nature is not 
for sale” (McAfee 1999) or controversies about whether it is morally acceptable to create 
markets in human organs (Roscoe 2013). One can strategically deploy or repurpose economic 
valuation, contesting existing valuation practices by specifically acknowledging the competing 
valuation regimes that are already baked into any price representation (see Kallis et al. 2013; cf. 
Matulis 2014). This approach is exemplified by Fourcade (2011) in her discussion of the 
different valuation outcomes in French and US oil spill litigation. French moral discomfort with 
the chosen valuation regime led to legally incomprehensible metrical descriptions of nature, 
which ultimately led to different and arguably worse outcomes than the (still deeply flawed) 
valuation process applied in the US in the Exxon Valdez disaster. A politics of value qua measure 





capitalist value is made visible as a special case of a broader principle for investigation and 
action. In any argument over value, such an approach can advocate for immediate 
environmental protections and compensation damages (that is, economic value) while leaving 
open the possibility for outright rejection of the long-term suitability of those measure on 
justice or ethical grounds (that is, moral value).  
 
We propose that more scholars should grapple with value in its various guises, seeking to find 
the ways in which these overlapping regimes are productive as well as incompatible. Value as 
both concept and social practice is too important and too ubiquitous to be ignored. We need 
more engagement with the forms that capitalist regimes of value take, how they are made, and 
how they might be reconfigured to create more just socionatural outcomes. One example of 
this approach is the work being done around California’s greenhouse gas cap-and-trade market, 
where scholars including Haya (2015), Asiyanbi (2016), MacAfee (2016), Osborne (2015) and 
Lohmann (2015) are actively engaging in both semiotic and moral value-work of contesting the 
expansion of the state’s GHG offset program to include jurisdictional REDD+ carbon credits. 
While not always explicitly framed in terms of value(s), their work provides an example of how 
different forms of arguments that fall under and between the rubrics of moral, economic, and 
semiotic value can be used to contest the expansion of explicitly capitalist values into new 
natures.  
 
Fortunately, we have the tools to investigate and potentially challenge valuation regimes from 
both within and without. Where the valuation regime of capital is less firmly entrenched, the 
extension of capitalist logics (and by extension, morals and semiotic regimes) may be more 
effectively countered by mobilizing marxian political economic critique. On the other hand, 
valuation operating in technocratic bureaucracies may instead call for critical engagement with 
the values embodied in technical artifacts that form the basis of novel commodities in 
subsumed in capital (Corbera 2014). By taking the view that value is simply the possibility of 
measurement, analysts of value can toggle between the subpolitics (Beck 1996, cited in 
MacKenzie 2009) of the technocrat and the “big P” moral politics of contesting what ought to 
be. Struggles over value are struggles over what counts: by contesting important moments, 
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